We study the optimal referral strategy of a seller and its relationship with the type of communication channels among consumers. The seller faces a partially uninformed population of consumers, interconnected through a directed social network. In the network, the seller offers rewards to informed consumers (influencers) conditional on inducing purchases by uninformed consumers (influenced). Rewards are needed to bear a communication cost and to induce word-of-mouth (WOM) either privately (cost-percontact) or publicly (fixed cost to inform all friends). From the seller's viewpoint, eliciting private WOM is more costly than eliciting public WOM. We investigate (i) the incentives for the seller to move to a denser network, inducing either private or public WOM and (ii) the optimal mix between the two types of communication. A denser network is found to be always better, not only for information diffusion but also for seller's profits, as long as private WOM is concerned. Differently, under public WOM, the seller may prefer an environment with less competition between informed consumers and the presence of highly connected influencers (hubs) is the main driver to make network density beneficial to profits. When the seller is able to discriminate between private and public WOM, the optimal strategy is to cheaply incentivize the more connected people to pass on the information publicly and then offer a high bonus for private WOM.
Introduction
Programs that attribute referral bonuses to customers are an established marketing strategy through which companies are able to increase the diffusion of their products. This strategy is effective since consumers are part of a network of acquaintances, and thus can be incentivized to use their social relationships to diffuse the knowledge about the existence of a company's product. Mass media advertisements are an imperfect alternative to increase diffusion, as information derived from mass media is not fully trusted by consumers, who tend to be more influenced by their social neighbors (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1966) .
In a typical referral-bonus program, a company offers rewards to its established customerbase, provided that they are able to convince some of their peers to become new clients. In order to obtain rewards, existing customers need to invest in their social network by informing their peers about a product. Depending on their willingness to pay, newly-informed agentsused to claim prizes (mobile phones, televisions etc.) which are typically more valuable than those offered by companies such as Dropbox.
1 Other well-known examples can be found in markets for telecommunication services (Vodafone), television broadcasting (Sky), payment systems (such as PayPal), tourist accommodations (e.g. AirBnB) and airlines (see the program You&Friends launched by Turkish Airlines).
In terms of communication channels, the seller's problem is then twofold. On the one hand, within private or public WOM, she needs to decide the relevant network of consumers: should it be limited or extended as much as possible? In other terms, the issue is whether to operate in a dense or in a sparse network. This decision is not trivial since informed clients are proposed to sustain a costly investment, but its return is uncertain due to two considerations. On one side, some of the peers contacted may not be willing to buy the product, even once they are aware of its existence. On the other side, uninformed consumers may get information about the service from multiple sources, while only one person can receive the resulting bonus. As we take these issues into account in modelling the expectations of consumers, we are able to focus on the tension between profits and product diffusion that characterizes markets with networked consumers. Finally, since giving the opportunity to share links privately or publicly elicits different incentives, a seller can further discriminate rewards based on the type of channel used to pass on the information. Thus, we study the reward structure to generate the optimal levels of private and public WOM.
In this paper, a population of consumers is divided between individuals informed about the existence of the product and others who are not, with a directed network linking the former to the latter. We consider a seller providing links to current customers. The latter receives per-friend bonuses conditional on each successful referral, which is activated when the contacted friend uses the link to make a purchase. Links can be shared with friends either publicly (posted on OSN walls) or privately (shared by emails). Under public WOM, if a buyer wants to inform all her out-neighbors, she only faces a lumpsum cost of communication. Differently, under private WOM, each friend informed entails a cost per contact. The seller decides the size of the individual reward, as well as the price of the product, discriminating between informed and uninformed consumers. Each consumer has private information about her own characteristics (degree and preference over the product), whereas the distribution of these characteristics is common knowledge.
From the point of view of the seller, an optimal reward trades-off between unitary mar-1 At current prices Dropbox offers a 1 TeraByte yearly retail contract for a price of for 99$ and a unitary referral reward of 500MB. This implies an equivalent reward per contact of 50 cents, much less than the commercial value of a mobile phone.
gins and the provision of adequate communication incentives. Concerning public WOM, the consumer's decision on communication depends on her popularity (out-degree): only sufficiently connected individuals are incentivized to bear the communication cost. Contrastingly, the decision to pass the information in private WOM concerns the individual link and it is not related to the size of the ego-network. In both types of WOM, reward size depends on the distribution of degrees and the in-degree drives the power of the referral program in terms of information spread. Our setup allows for findings along different lines. First, we are able to highlight the main trade-offs faced by the seller, given the network distribution and the WOM setup. Second, we study seller's incentives to choose a more or less dense network on which to run her referral program. Third, we analyze the optimal bonus combination when both private and public WOM is possible.
We start by studying the optimal bonus when the network as well as the type of communication elicited by the referral program are given. We find that the seller sets an optimal bonus in order to target a given diffusion objective. Diffusing the same level of information would be more costly for the seller under private WOM, as highly connected influencers help the seller in public but not in private WOM. In particular, in public WOM, only highly connected individuals are incentivized to pass the information. This makes congestion in public WOM less important than in the private regime, where decisions are made on the single link. As a result, the seller can diffuse more information and make higher profits using public WOM. This result provides a theoretical explanation for the observation that referral strategies, already present in the off-line world, become even more profitable and thus diffused in the OSNs world.
We can now turn our attention to the study of the channels. First, we analyze the choice between operating in a sparse or dense network. Second, we characterize the optimal mix between public and private WOM when the seller can discriminate the bonus according to the nature of channel used to share the link. In order to answer the first question, we consider broad classes of degree distributions and use the concept of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) to capture the impact of network density. In order to stimulate private WOM, it is always better for the seller to work in a denser network. This is because, for given bonus, the expected payment of each consumer increases as well as the proportion of people who pass on the information, with clear-cut positive impacts on profit. Differently, under public communication, the choice depends on network degree distribution. When both in-and out-degrees are homogeneous, a seller always has incentives to use as many channels of information diffusion as possible, thus proposing the bonus to a denser network, provided that the cost of communication is sufficiently small. Oppositely, if only the in-degrees are homogenous and/or the cost of information is sufficiently high, then the seller may prefer to offer the bonus to a sparser network. We also highlight the important role of hubs, which turn out to be the main driver toward situations in which a denser network improves both product diffusion and sellers' profits.
With regard to the optimal mix between public and private WOM, we highlight that accounting for the fact that offering a bonus incentivizes both private and public communication induces scope for discriminating strategies between the two channels. From the point of view of the individual consumer, private communication turns out not to depend on her degree. This non-network-based behavior reverses the relationship between seller's decision and hubs. If information is passed on only through Facebook and hubs are relatively important, the optimal strategy is to introduce a low bonus in the network so to use these web influencers to cheaply diffuse information.
Differently, a link can be shared by instant messaging and on OSN walls, the presence of hubs has a very different impact. Indeed, more important influencing hubs imply a sparser network, so that any given bonus maps into less communication. Since the private WOM (which is non-network-based) is more expensive for the seller, the public bonus has to increase in order to move people on the public channel thus guaranteeing optimal information diffusion.
The remaining part of this paper is divided as follows. After discussing the related literature in the following section, we outline the mathematical aspects of the model in Section 3 and we perform an equilibrium analysis under private and public WOM in Section 4. Then, we follow up with a comparative-statics analysis on the effects of network density (Section 5). In Section 6 we study the optimal mix between private and public incentives to communicate, before drawing conclusions (Section 7).
Related literature
Word-of-mouth communication (WOM) is empirically an important phenomenon. The seminal work of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1966) formulated the general theory that when people speak with each other and are exposed to information from media, their decisions are based on what peers and opinion leaders say rather than on what media communicate.
2 The role of peers in decision making is especially important when we consider agents as members of a social group, so that individual behavior is influenced by local network interactions (Jackson et al. 2016) .
3 Companies' strategies, can thus account for the fact that consumers interact with neighbors (Sundararajan 2007; Banerji and Dutta 2009 ) rather than with the overall population as in the traditional network externality approach (Katz and Shapiro 1985) .
4
Along the lines of this new tendency, our paper studies how to incentivize communication among consumers through a referral program, which is an alternative way to artificially create externality from consumption.
5
Our paper is not the first to discuss the management of referral strategies by companies. Incentivized WOM through referrals has been studied by Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) , Leduc et al. (2017) , Lobel et al. (2016) and Kamada andÖry (2017) , among others. Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) studied the optimal pricing and referral payments over consumers' lifetime. In our static model, we make consumers account for congestion effects derived by introducing the referral program on a network. More similar to our model, Lobel et al. (2016) studied the optimal referral schemes in a rooted network in which a focal consumer decided whether to purchase and whether to inform friends in exchange for a referral payment. They find that linear (e.g., "You earn 3$ or each new friend you bring") or threshold (e.g., "Earn 3$ for each of the first 4 friends that purchase the product") referral payments are a good approximation of the first best, which would be a non-monotonic payment structure (e.g., "Bring 3 friends and earn 20$ or bring 4 and earn 15$") hardly understandable by consumers. Relying on their quasi-optimality, we assume the linearity of payment and focus our analysis on the diffusion mechanisms (private and/or public WOM) and on the choice of channels (i.e., of the network density).
6 By assuming the consumer's network as an infinite spanning tree, 3 There is a growing literature on learning and diffusion in social networks, summarized in the recent surveys of Lamberson (2016) and Golub and Sadler (2016) . Diffusion of behaviours in a social network is known to depend on the connectivity distribution of the latter and on specific features of the diffusion rule (López-Pintado 2008) . Furthermore, the role of social influence on binary decisions for generic influence rules is studies by López-Pintado (2012) . 4 The concept of network locality has been used by Banerji and Dutta (2009) to show the emergence of local monopolies with homogeneous firms competing in prices, by Candogan et al. (2012) to study optimal pricing in networks with positive network externalities, by Bloch and Quérou (2013) to study the optimal monopoly pricing in on-line social networks and by Shi (2003) to study pricing in the presence of weak and strong ties in telecommunication markets. Other important models accounting for network externalities among consumers are Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016) and Chen et al. (2015) . 5 As pointed out by Lobel et al. (2016, p. 3516 ) "A referral program provides a way to artificially create network externality inducing complementarities in friends' purchase decisions." 6 In some sense, limiting network density is readable as a limit on the ego network of consumers, which an alternative operationalization of the Lobel et al. (2016) threshold payment. Lobel et al. (2016) neglects the congestion effect that is instead central in our model and in social network characterized by high degree of clustering (Watts and Strogatz 1998) . With a different approach, Leduc et al. (2017) and Kamada andÖry (2017) focus on the incentivized diffusion of products of uncertain quality. In particular, Kamada andÖry (2017) study free contracts as an alternative to referral which turn out to be more efficient when relatively few people are highly interested in the product. The introduction of free contracts creates a positive externality for the referrer as it increases the probability that the information recipient (freely) adopts the product. A similar mechanism is at play in our setup. Here, the probability of adoption is lowered by the congestion, which is indirectly manipulated by the seller's choice of relevant network and channel of diffusion. Unlike the latter but similarly to our work, Leduc et al. (2017) embeds consumers in a network, showing that high-degree people are worth being incentivized because even though they have more incentive to freeride, they are powerful conduits for the diffusion of information. Instead of fixing the network and studying the optimal referral-price pairs to diffuse information, we allow the seller to strategically choose the channel through which to implement the referral strategy. An alternative way of looking at WOM is considering consumers as engaging in this activity even in absence of incentives.
7 Thus, the focus of this literature is how companies can profit from boosting or reducing this activity. Along these lines, Campbell (2013) studies the optimal pricing when few consumers are initially informed and engage in WOM; Galeotti and Goyal (2009) discuss the optimal target to maximize market penetration with WOM; Galeotti (2010) investigates the relationship between interpersonal communication and consumer investments in search and Campbell et al. (2017) studies WOM versus advertising in a context where consumers derive utility from being perceived by peers as sources of information. When WOM is considered as given, the key issue for the seller is to understand in which circumstances WOM is positive or negative for profits and then act accordingly. Our WOM results from a deliberate incentive scheme predisposed by the seller. In other words, the strategy we analyze generates communication which would not exist otherwise.
Model
A seller seeks to sell a product to a measurable mass of consumers. A fraction 1 − β of them is informed about the existence of seller's product. The remaining fraction β is not informed. This paper focuses on the seller's optimal strategies with respect to the second set of consumers. One simple way to rationalize this focus is to assume that being or not being informed is strongly correlated with the willingness to pay of a consumer. People that are informed are also strongly interested in the seller's product, whereas non-informed people's reservation value for the product is uncertain. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that an informed consumer has a reservation value normalized to 1, whereas the reservation value of a non-informed one is v ∼ U [0, 1]. 8 All consumers are satiated at one unit. The seller offers the good at a price p 1 to informed consumers, and at a price p 2 to uninformed consumers. Moreover, the seller offers, to the informed customers, a unitary bonus b conditional on successfully informing each non-informed consumers.
9 If informed consumers pass on the information to the same uninformed buyer, and that uninformed buyer buys the product, each of them gets b in expected terms. In the following, we focus on the definition of the social network on which this referral campaign happens.
The social network
Informed consumers are linked with uninformed ones through a bipartite directed network, which is the only sub-network relevant for the problem at hand. While obviously any individual can in principle have other connections, only links going from the informed to the uniformed group can influence people's behavior. This network is such that informed consumers have an out-degree k distributed according to an i.i.d. degree distribution f (k), while uninformed consumers have an in-degree k distributed according to a i.i.d. degree distribution g(k). Nodal characteristics are private information whereas the distributions of degrees, information and reservation values are common knowledge. For the sake of consistency of the model, out-and in-degrees need to match, which is equivalent to say that:
implying that the average in-degree (weighted by the relative proportion of informed and uninformed consumers) equates the average out-degree. We define as k f min , k f max , k g min , k g max the minimal and maximal non-null elements in the support of f (k) and g(k). See also Appendix B for a description of the implicit mathematical assumptions behind this characterization.
8 The uniform distribution is chosen to simplify computation and exposition, but the qualitative results would not change with any well-defined distribution function. See Carroni et al. (2017) for an extensive analysis of the more general case. 9 Our focus here is the study of the decision on the network chosen by the seller. In principle, other referral bonus structures could be devised. The optimal referral schemes are studied by Lobel et al. (2016) , fixing the price of the product and a stylized network structure.
Communication and congestion
If communication is costly, only some informed consumers will pass the information when incentivized by the bonus b. For now, let us call L the fraction of links from informed to uninformed engaging in word-of-mouth communication. L will depend on the cost of passing the information, which determines how each consumer reacts to the communication incentive provided by the bonus. L will determine both the expected fraction of uninformed consumers who receive the information and the expected value of one out-link when passing the information, i.e., how many other agents are expected to inform the same buyer. On the one hand, the fraction of people receiving the information will be given by: On the other hand, as long as the receivers have multiple in-links, the offer of the bonus also induces some competition between informed consumers. Indeed, on a social network, an uninformed individual can become aware of the product by multiple sources. Therefore, the expected value of an informed consumer when passing the information needs to take into consideration this congestion effect. Let us call φ(L, p 2 ) the expected value (rescaled by b) of one out-link when passing the information. Function φ(L, p 2 ) is given by (i) the probability that the recipient of the message will buy the product, multiplied by (ii) the expected bonus the sender will receive, which depends on how many other informed consumers connected to the receiver may also have passed -in expectation -the information:
Congestion implies that φ(L, p 2 ) is a decreasing function of L, so that the more people pass the information on, the less would be the expected value that each of them benefits. The congestion effect is stronger as the number of communicators gets higher, but the problem becomes marginally less severe as many informed buyers pass the information.
11
The two functions φ(L) and Γ(L) are key to understanding the problem of the seller when setting the bonus b. Indeed, increasing the bonus will induce more people to communicate the existence of the product to friends, which boosts information diffusion, measured by Γ(L), as well as it reduces the expected value of each bonus to the consumers, measured by φ(L, p 2 ). Note also that a single informed consumer has no impact on these functions. This will allow us to consider a unique sub-game equilibrium of the game, once the monopolist has chosen prices and incentives.
The trade-off of the seller
The general problem of the seller is to maximize the following objective function:
where D 1 (p 1 ) and D 2 (p 2 ) are the demand of informed and uninformed consumers, respectively. The first element of this sum is the profit made on informed consumers which, in this setting, is trivially equal to 1 − β. Indeed, since the demand of informed consumers is inelastic for all prices below 1 and becomes infinitely elastic above, the optimal p 1 = 1.
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Hence, the problem of the seller can be simplified as:
The second element is the profit made on uninformed consumers, which takes into account that, for each of them reached by information and buying the product, one bonus is paid to an informed consumer. Hence this must be subtracted from the price p 2 and acts as a 11 Whenever g(1) < 1, φ(L, p 2 ) is decreasing and convex in L, and each element
and convex in k. Actually, for k = 1 we have that
is a constant, it is linear for k = 2, and then it becomes decreasing and strictly convex for each k ≥ 3. So, it is strictly convex only if g(1) + g(2) < 1. φ is 1 − p 2 when L = 0, and then it decreases to (1 − p 2 )
k , when L = 1. 12 Marginal cost is normalized to zero without loss of generality. 13 We refer to Carroni et al. (2017) for the study of the model with informed consumers' reservation value distributed as the one of non-informed people. What comes out in this more general case is in favor of the robustness of the simpler model that we analyze here: the optimal p 1 for the seller is the monopoly price that we would get in isolation.
marginal cost in the second term of equation (4). Contrastingly from informed consumers, an uninformed consumer needs to receive the information (which occurs with probability Γ(L)) and, once informed, buys only if
Given the objective of profit maximization, the seller has to choose how to put in place the referral bonus strategy, providing incentives to communication that determine the fraction of links from informed to uninformed engaging in WOM communication. We assume that the seller has two alternatives. The first one is to introduce in the social network incentives to share information about the product through a post on an OSN wall. In this case, once a consumer decides to share the information, this information is then accessible to all people connected with him/her. For this reason, we label this alternative as public WOM. The second one is to introduce incentives to share information privately friend-by-friend, e.g. by means of instant messaging or emails. We will refer to this second solution as private WOM.
Public WOM
The fraction L is determined by the decisions of each informed consumer. An informed consumer who makes a purchase is offered a code or a link to share with friends in his or her Facebook/Twitter page. Sharing the link on the on-line social network requires the consumer to incur a lumpsum cost c to inform all friends. When the code is used by a friend to buy the product, the informed consumer receives a bonus b. Given the cost of communication and the bonus, some informed buyers will pass on the information. In particular, an informed consumer with out-degree k will pass on the information only if
This means that, for each bonus offered by the seller, there exists a lower level k for which informed consumers with that degree are indifferent between passing on or not passing on the information. Given this cutoff, the fraction of links in which word-of-mouth communication occurs is:
Hence, given (6), function Γ(L(k)) and φ(L(k), p 2 ) depend on k. The first function is decreasing whereas the second one is increasing in the minimal degree required to communicate. Intuitively, if the cutoff k drops, the number of active links L increases, so to improve the flow of information -measured by Γ -as well as to intensify competition for successfully passing the information -measured by the decrease in φ. Combining (5) with (6), k, in equilibrium, must satisfy the following equality:
Notice that both terms in the left-hand-side of (7) are increasing in k, so there is a unique b satisfying each value of k. Hence, the problem of the seller is equivalent to fixing an optimal level of k * , and there is a one-to-one correspondence between k * ∈ [k f min , k f max ] and the set of optimal b * s. So, from (7), the problem (4) of the seller is equivalent to maximizing:
The solution to the seller's problem is stated in the following proposition, whose proof (as all the following proofs) is in Appendix A.
. Proposition 1 states that, once the seller identifies the k * that maximizes profits, the bonus will be just enough to induce the buyers with out-degree k * to pass on the information. Once information diffusion takes place, the price offered to newly informed consumers will simply be the monopoly price, i.e., 1/2. The degree distribution is key to determine the optimal k * , which trades-off between information diffusion and the size of the bonus. Indeed, lowering the cutoff would induce less-connected buyers to pass on the information, but would require a higher bonus to incentivize them to communicate. In the limit case in which the profit attainable when targeting k * = k f max is non-positive, the WOM communication is never profitable. This occurs when the bonus required to induce people with the maximal degree to pass on the information, i.e.,
, is higher than the price p 2 , so to make the seller unwilling to sell the product to non-informed consumers. In formulas the condition is:
, which means that, for given cost of communication, when the k f max is sufficiently likely to exist, competition is strong even though minimized. As a consequence, the bonus required to induce these highly-connected individuals to pass on the information is too high for the referral bonus to be profitable. Therefore, the seller wants to offer the product to informed consumers only. In all other cases, the seller always reaches and sells the product to some non-informed individuals.
Private WOM
Differently from the case of public WOM, we consider here the case in which an informed consumer who makes a purchase is offered a code or a link to share with friends via emails/instant messaging. Sharing the link requires contacting each friend individually. Therefore, differently from public WOM, a cost per contact c pr rather than a lump-sum cost of communication c is faced in order to pass on the information. Costs per contact better fit the case of private WOM rather than public WOM, where just a click would be sufficient to inform all friends. To capture the idea that contacting a friend individually requires more effort and causes more inconvenience than just posting an advertisement on social media, it is natural to assume c pr ≥ c. When we compare the two processes, in Section 6, we will actually set c pr = c. Similarly to the public WOM regime, the offer of a bonus induces each agent to pass on the information to a friend if adequately incentivized by b pr . The difference is that the decision upon communication here is based on each link rather than on the entire set of links. Namely, an informed buyer will pass on the information to a friend if the expected value of a bonus is sufficient enough to offset the cost c pr , which is assumed lower than 1/4, 15 i.e.:
Therefore, for any given bonus, the fraction of links from informed to uninformed consumers in which word-of-mouth communication is used will adjust in such a way that φ(L, p 2 )b pr = c pr . Indeed, if φ(L, p 2 )b pr were lower than c pr , informed consumers would face negative utility (excessive communication), whereas if the opposite were true, there would be some links for which communication would not occur even though it would have made some informed consumers better-off.
Notice that, for the informed consumers, each out-link will be considered as an independent problem, and every interior solution will be actually a mixed equilibrium in which each informed consumer is indifferent between passing on or not passing on the information to each of her links. It is also important to notice that such mixed equilibrium will be stable, because if we lower L, congestion will decrease, and it will be more profitable to pass on the information. In the same way, if we increase L, congestion will increase, and it will be less profitable to pass on the information.
Therefore, if there is a cost per contact, the fraction of links L in which communication occurs depends on the single interaction buyer-friend, so that the degree of the buyer does not play any role. In particular, the fraction of links passing on the information, L, depends on the incentives of each buyer to pass on the information to each of her friends.
The seller anticipates the effect of b on the behavior of informed buyers, so that the problem is equivalent to fix an optimal L, as there is a one-to-one correspondence between L ∈ [0, 1] and b, which simply becomes equal to
. Therefore, the problem of the seller becomes:
The equilibrium in the off-line network is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider a cost per contact c pr . The seller sets p *
, with the unique L * that solves:
In terms of optimal bonus, the result in Proposition 2 is very similar to the one in Proposition 1: the seller incentivizes the fraction of buyers that trades-off between profit margins (decreased by b) and demand (increased by b through Γ).
Product diffusion: Private vs Public WOM
In both private and public WOM cases, except specific situations, the seller never maximizes product diffusion making every consumer informed. This would be the case when L = 1. Intuitively, maximizing diffusion would be guaranteed by maximizing the number of spreaders. Maximizing the information spread would not be always compatible with the seller making non-negative profits. This depends on the cost of communication and the network density. To understand how, consider what would be the share of b that an informed consumer would expect to get from each link, if all informed consumers passed on the information. This is
E k [1/k] is a measure of network density, as the expected reciprocal of the in-degree is unambiguously lower as the network becomes denser. If the cost of communication is sufficiently small with respect to network density, then the maximal level of information could circulate on the network with the seller making positive profits.
Proposition 3. If the network is not too dense, it is always possible to inform all consumers making positive profits. Under public communication, it is needed that
. Under private communication, maximal information diffusion is compatible with positive profits when
Hence, when the network is not too dense in relation to the cost of communication, it is always possible for the seller to reach the maximal without making negative profits. When this occurs, all those people potentially interested are able to make a purchase. However, the network degree distribution is crucial to align/misalign information spread and sellers' profits. It is possible to establish a simple sufficient condition under which the seller will never maximize the information diffusion about the product, as well as making positive profits.
Proposition 4. Under private communication, the seller will never maximize the product diffusion regardless the network density. Under public communication,
The intuition is that the seller can maximize both profits and information diffusion only when it is possible and profitable for her to provide a b that is high enough so that even informed consumers with the lowest possible out-degree will pass on the information. However, the bonus that maximally spreads information is generically non-optimal. In particular, the optimal bonus never maximally diffuses information in the private WOM nor it does it in the public WOM if the network is sufficiently dense (so that E k [1/k] is small). Hence, eliciting public WOM could maximize information diffusion as a byproduct of profit maximization provided that the network is not too dense and therefore congestion is not too severe. This is never possible under private WOM. These differences are due to the fact that reaching any level of information is more costly under private WOM, where the individual incentives to communication are weaker and thus more difficult to be incentivized.
These aspects can be also noticed by comparing the bonuses and the profits under the two communication regimes.
Remark 1. Diffusing the same level of information would require a higher bonus under private WOM. As a result, the profit is always higher under public WOM.
Remark 1 stems from the fact that any given bonus surely generates more communication publicly than privately, since incentivizing the first type of WOM is obviously cheaper. This is a direct consequence of the intrinsic difference between private and public WOM. In the first type of communication, each consumer has to pass on the information to each contact, which is, for any given degree, more costly than passing the information through a post on Facebook. As a result, inducing the same level of communication is surely more costly for the seller. Thus, for a given bonus, the profits that can be made by eliciting public WOM are always higher than the ones than can be made under private WOM.
To conclude the present section, notice that we drew attention to the optimal choices of a seller who wants to stimulate either private or public WOM, highlighting a link between network density and information diffusion. The remainder of the paper aims to answer two questions that naturally arise, regarding the network the seller prefers to implement her strategy as well as the strategy itself.
The first question is the following. If either public or private communication are used to spread the word among consumers, how many channels of information diffusion should be used by a company to run its referral program? Such a decision is ascribable to the one of choosing a denser or a sparser network. In other words, if the seller has the choice between two different networks, a sparse and a dense network, is it possible to move from the former to the latter while increasing profits? What is the effect of this choice on the information spread? What is the role of hubs/web influencers? How does this choice differ between private and public WOM? We will provide answers to all these questions in the following section.
The second question concerns the mix between public and private WOM. Proposition 1 seems to suggest that public WOM is always better for the seller. However, in real markets both types of communication are elicited. For example, referral programs, such as the ones used by Dropbox and Airbnb, give the consumer the opportunity to share the referral link through different media: OSNs, email etc. However, this is usually done by offering a bonus conditioned only on successful referral and is independent of the channel that generated it. According to our analysis, this seems to be suboptimal, as discriminating bonuses would take into account the different individual incentives elicited. Namely, the seller could discriminate between public and private communication, offering a bonus whose value depends on whether a given friend is informed through a post on Facebook or through a private message. This will be discussed in Section 6.
Moving to a denser network
Companies running a referral program have different alternatives to pursue their objectives. One important decision is whether to stimulate WOM in a denser or in a sparser social network of friendships and acquaintances. On the one hand, operating in a dense network improves the information spread; as the more people are connected with each other, the easier is to inform each person about the product. On the other hand, operating in a sparser network reduces competition among buyers, making it cheaper for the seller to incentivize communication. The decision of selling in a sparser network can be interpreted in two alternative ways. Under public WOM, for example, it could be either read as the choice of the seller to stimulate WOM only on the social network provided by Facebook, instead of the combination of Facebook, Twitter, and possibly other social media (which are clearly super-networks compared to just Facebook alone). Similarly, under private WOM, it can be interpreted as allowing to pass on the bonus only through emails rather than emails plus instant messaging. In general, it can alternatively be interpreted as a limitation of the ego network of each consumer through a restriction of the maximal number of bonuses each agent can obtain.
In the following, we will compare a sparser and a denser social network in order to understand when product diffusion and profits can both be improved moving from a sparser network to a denser network, or when this decision improves on one of the two dimensions but undermines the other one. Moving from the sparser to the denser network simply means adding links, so that both in-degree and out-degree distributions f (k) and g(k) receive a shift towards higher density. Because of this, we can formally use the concept of first-order stochastic dominance, adopting the definition below provided by Lamberson (2016) . Definition 1. A distribution f first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) a distribution f if, for everyk ∈ {1, ..., ∞}, and for every nondecreasing function u : R → R, it holds that:
In the following, we will explore the choice within communication regimes, i.e. private and public WOM. In the first case, the seller has to decide whether to move from a sparser to a denser network stimulating Private WOM (Section 5.1). We also demonstrate that this situation is qualitatively similar to a case in which the seller focuses only on information diffusion under public WOM, i.e., fixing the degree cutoff for communication k. Then, in Section 5.2, the seller has to decide whether to stimulate public WOM in a denser or in a sparser network with the objective of profit maximization. Namely, the cutoff k is allowed to be adjusted in the denser network to its profit-maximizing level. In this case, the choice of operating in a denser network might be detrimental in terms of information diffusion.
Density and Private WOM
We start by analyzing how the choice of going to a denser network affects profits when the seller stimulates private WOM. Let us assume a shift in the in-degree distribution to some g (k) which FOS-dominates g(k). In order to maintain matching between the numbers of inand out-degrees as defined in equation (1), and since we are considering a superset network, also a FOSD shift to some f (k) is needed. Let us consider the incentives to pass on the information expressed by the inequality in (9). For any given bonus b pr put into the network by the seller, the fraction of active links adjusts until there is no incentive to speak further. Therefore:
For any given b pr and c pr , the effect of a FOSD shift from g(k) to g (k) is to increase φ(L) to φ (L), because for any given proportion of active links, each agent has more out-links. Therefore, at the original level of L in the sparser network, the equality above no longer holds as L < P rob(b pr φ (L) > c pr ). In other words, there is insufficient communication, as some consumers would have incentives to pass on the information and are not doing so. As a result, for given bonus b pr , the level of active links in the new network must adjust to a higher level L . As a result, for any given bonus, the seller succeeds in informing more consumers, so that Γ increases in the denser network, thus allowing us to conclude the following:
Remark 2. Under private WOM, the seller always makes higher profits in the denser network.
Density and Public WOM
An effect similar to the one discussed in Section 5.1 pushes density to increase information diffusion under public WOM when there are small changes in the in-and out-degree distributions and the level of k * is kept fixed, which means that the proportion of buyers passing on the information to friends cannot drop going from the sparser to the denser network.
Proposition 5. If k * is kept fixed, product diffusion improves when the nodes are more likely to have higher degrees (as a consequence of a FOSD shift).
The message of Proposition 5 is that a denser network is always better for product diffusion. Indeed, the FOSD shift of the proposition above goes in the direction of enhancing product diffusion, as the k * does not adjust to its optimal level in the denser network and thus only the information-diffusion effect of the FOSD is at play. Since people are more connected, more information circulates on the social network and thus more people buy the product. The point is that this would not necessarily benefit profits, as the impact of higher network density on competition for bonuses is completely disregarded. Any bonus paid to a consumer has the objective of maximizing the set of buyers, without taking into account the competition for bonuses. Contrastingly, the effects of a FOSD increase in f (k) and g(k) on profits are not as unambiguous as they are for information diffusion. This is because, even though operating in a denser network increases the proportion of activated links L, and also the proportion of links receiving the information Γ(L), the effects on b = c φk shift in the opposite direction, as the FOSD boosts competition between informed consumers. As a result, the seller will be forced to increase b to compensate for this, if she wants to maintain the same k * . Both in-and out-degrees are Bernoulli random networks with probability of an in-link λ g = 0.1, λ f ∼ 0.0251 and β = 0.2. FOSD is done by increasing λ g by 1.6 · 10 −3 . Right Panel: Example in which a denser network is profitable. Both in-and out-degrees are random networks with λ g = 0.44, λ f ∼ 0.2931 and β = 0.4. FOSD is performed by increasing λ g by 1 · 10 −3 . In both cases network size is 1000.
In Figure 1 , we report examples of slight FOSD shifts which do not entail any changes in the optimal k. As it can be observed, there are cases in which moving to the denser network is profit-enhancing and others in which it is not. The density of the network and the proportion of uninformed people become crucial, as they determine the gains in terms of information spread that would follow a switch to a denser network. The left panel considers a case in which there are few uninformed people on a relatively sparse network. In this case, a marginal increase in density creates a negligible amount of additional information spread. Moreover, a higher density also strengthens competition among informed buyers, and therefore requires a higher bonus. The balance between competition and diffusion of information makes it not worth it to operate in the denser network. Differently, when many uninformed consumers are laid on a denser network (right panel), information diffusion becomes more salient to the seller. Therefore, she finds it profitable to pay the higher unitary bonus needed for passing on the information, as the gains in terms of information diffusion are more significant.
When setting the optimal k * , the seller faces a trade-off between increasing information diffusion (represented by Γ) and reducing the cost of providing incentives. Lowering k * will boost Γ but will also make competition among informed consumers tougher, requiring a higher b. This comparative-statics analysis is non-trivial and its results strongly depend on the functional forms given to the degree distributions. The trade-off between information diffusion and competition among consumers is clear-cut even if not analytically provable in general. Nevertheless, the analysis of archetypal situations allows us to assess network topologies that helps us to assess the effects of the network density on seller's incentives and optimal decisions. In what follows, we highlight two main aspects. First, we show the emergence of instances in which operating in a sparser or a denser network can be better for profits, considering simple cases of degree homogeneity and specific types of FOSD. Second, we underline the role of hubs in the optimal decision of the seller.
Homogenous degree
The following proposition considers the simplest case in which all consumers have the same in-and out-degree. This allows us to eliminate any effect of density increase on the number of consumers who pass on the information.
Proposition 6. Let the out-degree be k f and the in-degree be k g for all agents. In this case, moving to a denser network with k f > k f and k g > k g is always weakly profitable for the seller. If the seller was using word-of-mouth in the sparser network, then operating in the denser one is always strictly more profitable and improves information diffusion.
The interpretation of the results of Proposition 6 is straightforward. Indeed, this is a degenerate case in which the absence of variance in the degrees allows the seller to fully extract the surplus of communicators who are all infra-marginal. The resulting incentives are clear-cut: the choice of the seller is whether to make people at k f willing to pass on the information for any given network density. Depending on the cost of communication, this might be profitable or not in the sparser network. As far as moving to a denser network is concerned, there is a positive effect on the information spread Γ(L * ) for any given number of targeted senders L * , whereas the marginal cost of providing the required incentives remains constant in both networks. Therefore, the seller always increases profits for any given number of senders. This has to be intended as a weak condition, meaning that the cost of communication might be so high to prevent profitable diffusion of information both in the sparser and in the denser network. However, as discussed in many cases below, the seller faces a material trade-off when introducing variability in the degrees.
In relation to Proposition 6, we now relax the assumption of homogeneity in the degree of informed consumers and search for sufficient conditions under which the seller prefers the sparser network. First of all, notice that the fraction of senders is required to not decrease (too much) in relation to the sparser network for information diffusion to improve when the seller serves the denser network. Formally:
Lemma 7. Consider a situation in which the in-degree distribution is homogeneous. Unless all consumers get informed in the sparser network, it is always possible to find a sufficiently pronounced FOSD shift such that operating in the denser networks improves information diffusion.
The main important factor for information diffusion is the fraction of people receiving the information, which is an increasing function of L. Lemma 7 expresses a sufficient condition by focusing on the limit case in which every buyer passes on the information in the original network. If the increase in density makes the seller set incentives such that all buyers pass the information also in the denser network, then diffusion is trivially enhanced, as condition in Lemma 7 is always satisfied.
16 On the other side, if less people pass on the information at equilibrium, for the change to inform more people, it is necessary that the gain in information diffusion entailed by the higher density overcomes the reduction in the fraction of communicators. This always happens when the FOSD shift is sufficiently pronounced, so that the condition in Proposition 7 is satisfied. However, the seller may prefer to operate in the sparser network, as we show in the following Proposition:
Proposition 8. Consider a situation in which the in-degree distribution is homogeneous. Consider a FOSD shift such that k g increases to k g , and f (k) also has a FOSD shift to some f (k), so that the consistency condition in equation (1) , then it is possible to find a distribution f (k) such that the seller will obtain strictly lower profits in the denser network.
In contrast to what was discussed for Proposition 6, here the absence of variability in the in-degrees is a problem for a seller facing a denser network. Indeed, the congestion is, in a sense, maximal within a given network structure: the non-informed consumers are all connected to the highest number of influencers present with positive probability. Serving a denser network exacerbates the congestion effect. Thus, if the cost of communication is sufficiently high, we can always find situations in which operating in a denser network requires such high bonuses to be profit detrimental compared to those of the sparser network. The cost's threshold increases in the proportion of non-informed consumers. As the information problem becomes more severe, the seller is more likely, for any given network, to use bonuses to generate new demand.
Uniform random network
To stress the robustness of Proposition 8, we numerically study a network where the in-degree is not homogeneous. Consider a directed network in which each link from one informed consumer to one uninformed consumer is independent and identically distributed. Starting from such a random network, we consider a FOSD shift such that the in-degrees increases uniformly, while all additional out-links are added only to nodes relatively poorly connected (see Figure 2) . 17 In practice, it is as if a channel is included in the network that provides more communication to only those informed consumers that had originally a lower outdegree. What we obtain in this case is reported in the claim below.
Claim 1. Consider homogeneous in-degree and out-degree distributed according to a binomial distribution (random network). Consider a FOSD shift such that k g increases to k g . Accordingly, add all the additional out-links below an out-degreek, keeping f (k) constant abovek. Then, ifk is sufficiently low and the FOSD shift is sufficiently pronounced, the seller prefers to operate in the sparse network.
Claim 1 says that if the denser network is a FOSD shift, as described in Figure 2 , operating in a sparser network would make the seller better-off. This FOSD exacerbates congestion among informed people without adding more in terms of information diffusion. As a consequence, the sparse network is preferred by the seller. 
The role of hubs
It is well known that hubs can be powerful drivers of information diffusion due to their disproportionate large degree.
In this section, we analyze the role of hubs in the preference of the seller regarding network density. By making a FOSD shift characterized by the introduction of highly connected influencers, we are able to show that it is possible to have denser networks associated with a decline in information diffusion. Formally:
Proposition 9. Suppose that k f max is finite, and that the seller chooses k * such that
. In this case, it is always possible to consider a FOSD shift of the network, such that the seller maximizes profits in the denser network, but diffusion is lowered by this choice.
As formally explained in the proof of Proposition 9, an example of FOSD shift causing the described scenario is when we add a few very influencing people (super-hubs or webinfluencers) to the original network, redistributing the additional in-links homogeneously. If the seller incentivizes only these super-hubs to diffuse information, the latter would suffer very limited congestion, making their required bonus cheap. For this to be convenient with respect to a strategy of getting also less connected individuals on board, super-hubs degree must be sufficiently high in order not to lose too much in terms of information diffusion. However, if the proportion of receivers among uninformed consumers in the original network is sufficiently close to 1, this actually reduces diffusion.
This general result points to the fact that the presence of few people with tremendously high levels of influence makes a referral strategy very attractive to the seller. Indeed, even a minimal reward would induce these people to pass on the information with little congestion. The presence of hubs, favors the denser network since density does not entail a material loss in demand. As a result, the seller can reach many people even by inducing only few clients to engage in communication.
As intuition would suggest, the presence of hubs is the main driver that makes network density not only beneficial to information diffusion but also to profits. In what follows, we provide a numerical result that fixes a FOSD shift and compare different classes of inand out-degree distribution. Overall, the numerical exploration of the model supports the following claim.
Claim 2. Fixing a FOSD shift, moving to the denser network is profit-enhancing except in very specific cases. It becomes also effective in information diffusion as we move from a network without hubs to a network with hubs.
When there are no hubs, the seller balances the information diffusion and the congestion inducing influencers with a degree higher than the characteristic one to diffuse information. This is true for any given network density. As shown in Figure 3 (left panel), serving the denser network is surely profitable for the seller as long as the original distribution of in-links is not too dense.
18 However, from the standpoint of information diffusion, the picture is much richer and the observable absence of a pattern essentially depends on discontinuous changes in the optimal k, which affect the amount of information circulating in the network. When
18 Notice that when in-links are very dense operating in a denser network becomes less likely to be attractive than operating in a sparser one (blue and black areas in left panel). 
Seller's incentives
in the denser network, the seller anticipates the stronger congestion, so that the optimal targeted k shifts upwards in order to partially offset the increase in congestion. This makes less information circulate in the denser network, with detrimental consequences on product diffusion (green areas). Considering cases where the in-degree distribution presents hubs (central and right panels of Figure 3 ), moving to a denser network is always profit-increasing. This follows from two facts. Let us consider an originally sparse network with few hubs attracting most of the inflow of information: these people are the main source of congestion for influencers. Once a denser network is faced, the increase in congestion is smaller in comparison to the previous case, as these "monopolizers" of information still remain the main source of congestion. Therefore, the seller will sell her product in the denser network, since the positive effect on information diffusion associated with this movement largely outweighs the additional cost of congestion. However, diffusion-decreasing scenarios still occur. Indeed, the seller might want to reduce the proportion of senders to limit congestion and this can result in a reduction in the number of influenced people. This tension disappears when hubs are present also in the out-degree distribution (Figure 3, right panel) . This result spurs from a reasoning similar to the one regarding influenced hubs. More precisely, influencing hubs are, for any given network density, the main source of information spread. Therefore, a FOSD shift does not imply a strong change in the optimal behavior of the seller, as those hubs still remain the most important spreaders. Therefore, the denser network always guarantees a higher spread of information at equilibrium.
To sum up, and compare the theoretical results from the previous section with the outcome of the simulations, the following can be said about public WOM. When both influencers and influenced networks have homogeneous degree distributions, profit maximization is guaranteed by operating in a denser network and this also enhances market penetration (Proposition 6 and Claim 1). This is because in the denser network, the demand is higher without increasing the cost of word-of-mouth stimulation. Differently, when the network of influencers is not homogeneous, it is always possible to find situations in which, if the cost of communication is sufficiently high, higher network density induces too much congestion (Proposition 8). Moreover, in presence of online super-hubs, the optimal profitmaximizing strategy would be to diffuse information only through web-influencers, however possible at the expenses of reducing diffusion of information (Proposition 9). The crucial role of hubs is confirmed by an extensive analysis of numerical solutions on a wide class of networks (Claim 2). When hubs are not important in either networks, any outcome can potentially emerge, i.e., we can have situations in which a denser/sparser network is optimal for profits/penetration, depending on parameters. The picture changes when the sparse network is characterized by few hubs among the influenced people (with out-degree distribution still symmetrically centered). These hubs are the main source of congestion. Hence, their presence makes the denser-network solution less consequential in terms of congestion, thus making the latter more respondent to the objective of profit maximization. However, a profit-maximizing strategy might still reduce information spread and thus market penetration. Finally, if disproportionately connected individuals are also present in the out-degree distribution, the incentives of the seller to mitigate congestion are less substantial and this aligns profit maximization with market penetration.
6 The optimal mix between Public and Private WOM So far, we have considered the stimulation of Public and Private WOM separately. However, many sellers use both simultaneously. The aim of this section is to understand which would be the optimal choice of a seller who wants to elicit WOM both publicly and privately. To do so, we simply account for the fact that any given bonus generates different incentives going from the public to private regime, as to generate the same information diffusion in the latter would require stronger incentives to communication (higher bonus). Since, as discussed in Proposition 1, the bonus required to reach a certain degree of communication is lower under public WOM, this would always be preferred by the seller if either public or private WOM is used. If instead the seller can discriminate between the two channels, one may think that the people relatively more popular pass the information publicly, whereas people with a relatively low out-degree could still opt for private per-contact WOM. In the following, we first characterize the optimal bonuses and then we highlight the main differences in the incentive structure between a public-only and public-plus-private setup.
Optimal mix
For the sake of exposition, let us modify the profit of the seller as follows:
where E[B|b pub , b priv ] is the expected amount paid by the seller for each successful referral. With respect to the previous cases, two main differences emerge. Firstly, the fraction of link from informed to uninformed consumers L is composed by links activated both privately (L priv ) and publicly (L pub ). Secondly, given the individual incentives to pass on the information privately and publicly, the seller may end up in a situation in which a private bonus b priv or a public bonus b pub have to be paid to the referrer. In order to pin down these values, 19 p * 1 = 1 as in public and private WOM studied separately.
we assume that an informed consumer faces the same cost to pass the information publicly (to all her friends) or privately (to one of her friends), i.e., c pr = c.
20
Let us first analyze the case of public WOM. An agent with degree k has to decide whether to pass on the information publicly or not. When the code is used by a friend to buy the product, the informed consumer receives the bonus b pub . This will happen with a probability φ(L priv , L pub , p 2 ), that this time depends not only on the number of other informed consumers passing the information publicly but also privately.
Given the cost of communication and the bonus, some informed buyers will pass the information. In particular, an informed consumer with out-degree k will pass the information only if
Similar to the case of public WOM only, each bonus offered by the seller maps into a cut-off of minimal degree k needed to be willing to pass the information, so that the fraction of links in which public WOM occurs is:
with
given that, by equation (12), any bonus which does not make equation (12) hold with equality would leave an extra surplus to the buyer.
On the private channel, the fraction of links in which private WOM occurs is the L priv such that, for any given bonus, no additional link is worth being activated, i.e.,
Notice that equations (12) and (14) say that for any b priv and b pub the cutoff k will adjust in such a way that b priv = b pub k, so that the fraction of links passing the information privately and the fraction of links passing the information public will equalize. Intuitively, if the private bonus increases (so that also the ratio b priv /b pub increases), people are more likely to be willing to pass the information privately. This increases competition for bonuses so that the expected value φ is lower. Thus, if the bonus b pub is kept fixed, the incentives to pass the information publicly are lower, so that k goes up. At equilibrium, the fraction of links passing on the information publicly and privately will be such that L pub = L priv . Therefore, exploiting equation (13), we can pin down the expected fraction of links passing the information overall, i.e.:
Notice that the first element of the sum above is the proportion of links in which public information exchange occurs, whereas the second element is the expected fraction of links in which only private communication occurs. Indeed, since private WOM depends on the single interaction buyer-friend, the degree of the buyer does not play any role. Therefore, a buyer of any degree is equally likely to pass on the information privately in each interaction. As a consequence, the probability of people passing the information only privately is L pub multiplied by the proportion of links not passing the information publicly.
To break ties, we assume that if an agent passes the information to a friend both publicly and privately, the probability that the seller pays bonus b pub or b priv is equal to 1/2, depending on the code used by the friend.
21 Accordingly, the number of bonuses b pub expected to be paid at equilibrium is given by the fraction of links in which public communication occurs multiplied by 1/2, to take into account that the remaining 1/2 of successful referrals would require a payment of b priv . Differently, the fraction of links in which communication is only private, i.e., , the expected amount paid by the seller in case of successful referrals is:
Hence, the problem of the seller is equivalent to the following:
The solution to the seller's problem is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 10. If the seller discriminates between private and public WOM, then the optimal price is the monopoly price p * 2 = 1/2, the public bonus is b *
and the private bonus is
21 One may also assume a strategic behavior of consumers, who then would always use the link leading to the higher bonus for their friend. In that case, the probability of paying b priv becomes 1. This would not introduce any qualitative change in our results.
Proposition 10 shows the optimal discriminating bonuses, which are generically of different sizes. Indeed, the optimal k * has to be read as the ratio between the bonus offered for successful referrals coming from private versus public communication. The k * actually depends on the structure of the social network considered. The next section describes a specific yet relevant example of the striking impact of accounting for private WOM when the discriminating bonuses are used.
The impact of private WOM on public incentives
Todays' digital markets are characterized by the presence of extremely connected influencing hubs, the so-called web influencers. These hubs tend to be the focus of company strategies, as they are effective and inexpensive vehicles for diffusing information. We thus decide to set the out-degree distribution as a scale-free and the in-degree as a Bernoulli. In particular, Figure 4 describes a situation in which the out-degree distribution is scale free while the in-degree one is random. Going from left to right, we progressively increase γ f , thus making hubs less important in the distribution (Barabási 2016, Ch. 4.6 ). When the company sets incentives considering only public WOM, the trade-off is between information diffusion and the associated cost. As it can be observed in Figure 4 (Red Curve), the optimal strategy turns out to depend on the relative importance of hubs as information diffusers. A larger γ f implies a larger share of the population with very few connections and relatively fewer connected hubs. The latter are then very important for information diffusion, relative to the large mass of poorly connected consumers. When γ f is low, the higher implied density of the network reduces the relative importance of hubs. As a consequence, we observe a rather sharp transition between targeting only the hub (small bonus) or incentivizing also the network spokes to pass the information (higher bonus).
When private WOM is also taken into account, the seller faces an additional tradeoff. Indeed, for any given private bonus, if the seller increases the public bonus, relatively less connected people will start communicating publicly, thus increasing congestion and reducing the incentives to spread information privately. In doing this, the seller reduces the probability of paying high bonuses to private speakers. Thus, from the point of view of the seller, while private WOM is a residual means of information diffusion, it provides an additional incentive toward public WOM. As it can be observed in Figure 4 (Blue Curve) k * now decreases in γ f . Indeed, as hubs become more important, the seller offers higher public bonuses in order to reduce the intensity of the more expensive private WOM.
Conclusion
Network-related referral strategies are an important market-penetration tool for today's companies. The use of these strategies in many different markets has exponentially grown thanks to online platforms and social media. Indeed, the latter has enhanced the outreach efforts of companies, giving them an effective and relatively inexpensive way to inform consumers about the products they sell. Referral strategies seem to be win-win solutions when a seller faces a partially uninformed pool of consumers as the former increases its demand incentivizing informed consumers with rewards, while uninformed people are made aware about possibly valuable products. Many potential channels are available for companies interested in introducing referral programs. OSNs, SMSs, emails and instant messaging are all means that, together, can help a a firm become known to consumers in a very effective way. Nevertheless, companies often do not exploit all these possible channels, but rather limit their strategy to only some of them or, alternatively, cap rewards as to restrict the ego-network of consumers. At first sight, a more penetrative strategy, maximizing information diffusion by fully exploiting all informed consumers' links seems to be trivially profit maximizing, especially since most firms condition influencers' rewards based on the purchases of influenced people.
In this paper, we show that the optimal strategy of the firm is not trivial and it is always a joint combination of two channels of diffusion. One is such that the cost of sharing the information is fixed for the informed consumer, as is the case for online social networks (and we call the communication occurring on those media public WOM ). The other is such that the cost is proportional to the actual peers that the informed consumer contacts, as is the case of face-to-face interaction and SMS messages (private WOM ). Thus, the second type of communication is not influenced by consumer's network position, while the first entails a strong impact of the network on decision. As a consequence, the firm may not want to address network that is too dense (e.g., include the possibility of sharing the news with Facebook and Twitter), but may prefer a sparser network (e.g., only for Facebook).
The rationale for firms to limit the scope of potential activation of influencers' ties (or to simply stay in a sparser network) is congestion, i.e., the fact that, in a network, non-informed people may receive information by multiple sources. As a result, the more numerous the buyers who become active influencers, the harder it is -for each of them -to obtain a bonus. Therefore, a seller has to consider the trade-off between demand size (information spread) and the marginal cost of attracting that demand (giving the right incentives through bonuses). In this regard, network density is crucial and has two opposite effects. On the one hand, it makes congestion stronger, thus accruing the cost of providing incentives to communicate. On the other hand, it increases the information spread by influencers for fixed incentives. When the first effect dominates, the seller should operate in a sparser network, somehow limiting the new demand attracted. Oppositely, if the latter demand effect prevails, maximizing the outreach should be the dominant concern of the seller.
The attractiveness of bonuses is enhanced by the presence of few very connected influencers (hubs), who are cheaper to incentivize and guarantee a large information diffusion with little congestion. This is true for any given network density and drives the optimal choice of the seller. When operating in a denser network it gives access to super-hub consumers that are not present in a sparser one, a profit-maximizing company should always choose the latter. In contrast, if everyone was (homogeneously) more connected, then it might be optimal to sell the product in the sparser network where congestion is less severe.
However, any strategy that relies only on public WOM will neglect the fact that informed individuals can pass on product information on multiple channels. This raises scope for discriminating strategies between publicly and privately generated product diffusion. In particular, considering also private WOM induces the seller to offer a higher public bonus in order to move people on this channel. This allows to optimally spread information, not only relying on hubs but on a broader pool of informers.
Similarly to the case of lump-sum costs, independently of the choice of b, charging a price p 1 = 1 to informed consumers and a price p 2 = 1/2 are the optimal strategy. Plugging the optimal prices into the profit function, the seller sets L * to solve:
The first order condition for this problem is:
Notice that, provided that 1/2 > c pr /φ, 22 profits are concave in L. Indeed:
by concavity of Γ and convexity of φ
, φ = 1/2 and Γ = 0. Therefore:
Moreover, the fact that ∂Γ ∂L | L=1 = 0 together with ∂φ ∂L < 0 imply that the profit is decreasing in L when L = 1. As a consequence L * is always interior, it is unique and it solves:
Proof of Proposition 3, page 16
Under public communication, the profit of the seller is
When k is set equal to k f min , L = 1, so that Γ = 1 is clearly maximal, as every consumer willing to pay the price of the product will buy the product. In this case
Pugging φ(1) = E k [1/k]/2 into the profit, it is easy to verify that it is fulfilled only if
. Similarly, φ(1, 1/2) = E k [1/k] also under private WOM, where the profit is:
c pr .
Proof of Proposition 4, page 16
Since the choice of k is concerned in optimizing (8), we refer only to the profit the seller makes on second-period consumers, expressing b in terms of the other variables:
The seller would maximize profits and diffusion simultaneously if k = k f min and then L = 1. (16) is null. So, k = k f min cannot be an optimal choice for the seller, because it is dominated by k = k f max .
Proof of Proposition 5, page 19
Since the threshold k remains fixed, a FOSD shift from f (k) to f (k) makes
Therefore, each 1 − (1 − L) k increases. In the expression of Γ(L ), as given by equation (2), 1 − (1 − L) k is also an increasing function in k. So, given that also g (k) FOS-dominates g(k), we can use Definition 1 and obtain
So Γ(L) ≤ Γ(L ).
Proof of Proposition 6, page 21
Let us consider a network where all consumers have in-degree equal to k g and out-degree equal to k f . From the consistency condition in (1) it must hold that (1 − β)k f = βk g . Plugging into (2) and (3), we get:
Using consistency condition (1), the profit in equation (16) 
Notice that equation (18) has a concave increasing part and a linearly decreasing one. A FOSD shift would affect the former but not the latter. On the one hand, in a denser network the function Γ (L) maps L into higher values than the original Γ(L). On the other hand, the FOSD shift does not entail any effect on the linear part, which depends only on the slope (1 − β)c that is not affected by network density. Therefore, for any L the after-FOSD profit will always be above than the pre-FOSD one. Both information diffusion and seller's profit increase.
Proof of Lemma 7, page 22
If the seller chooses some L * , information diffusion only depends on
When k g increases to some k g , L * may move to some L = L * − with > 0. Plugging into Γ , we get that the denser network enhances market diffusion if:
23 This will be the case whenever c φ(L)k f < 1/2 for all L ∈ (0, 1), so that profits made on uninformed consumers would be negative. .
Proof of Proposition 8, page 23
Let us consider a network where all consumers have in-degree equal to k g . Let us first consider what would be the profit of the seller choosing a certain L. Plugging into (2) and (3), we get again the system from (17). Now, however, k will vary as a certain L is targeted, and we have that the profit in equation (16) becomes either null (if the seller does not use word of mouth) or:
Now suppose to fix both k and the fraction q of consumers with degree k that pass the information in equilibrium. We have that:
Any couple (k, q) will be feasible also going to a denser network, and fixing them we will have L > L. For any couple (k, q), the profit in equation (16) becomes:
Now consider the case in which k = k f min (minimal cost for the seller to provide incentives to communication) and Γ → 1 (maximal information spread). A sufficient condition for each couple (k, q) to provide negative profits is that in this best scenario gives negative profits, or formally:
, that using condition (1), becomes 24 Notice that, in this simple case, we would have ρ = f (k f max ), i.e. only more connected influencers pass the information and maximal information spread is guaranteed.
Going to a denser network we can get
as close to 1 as we want, so that f (k f max )
as well goes to 1. Therefore, c > β 2 4(1−β) becomes a sufficient condition for the existence of a denser network that is not profitable for the seller. Notice that if k f max was high enough in the original network, then it could have been possible to find a couple (k, q) such that (20) was positive in the original sparser network, but negative in the denser network.
and are still free to pick anyk.
Step 2: we can improve on the payoff from the old network. Now, the seller's objective function can be reduced to where Λ(L ) = k : ∞ k=k f (k) = L . The last step is guaranteed by the assumption that
, and by the fact that we can achieve → 0 and lim k→∞k φ k , 1 2 = +∞ .
So for any of the feasible k in the old network, we can choose ,k and m, so that the seller can do better in the new network choosing to do word-of-mouth only with the superhubs. Since, the set of all feasible k's in the old network is finite, we can satisfy the conditions of this last step of the proof.
N and a degree distribution given by:
(1/n γ ) , where 2 < γ ≤ 3 represents the slope of the power law.
25
Scale-free networks entail the presence of hubs, i.e., nodes with very high degree with respect to the network' average, while in random networks these disproportionally-connected nodes are extremely rare. For this reason, in what follows we refer to the first type of networks as networks with hubs and to the latter as networks without hubs. Given that the only topological characteristic of the networks which is relevant for the definition of participants decisions in our model is the distribution of degrees, our numerical analysis of random and scale-free networks completes the study of the effects of in-and out-degree distributions on profits and information diffusion for what concerns empirically-observed network structures.
Considering these network structures, FOSD shifts in Section 5.2 result from increasing λ g (for the random network) and decreasing γ g (for the scale-free networks) of 2.5 · 10 −2 , without changing k f max and k g max . In both cases we are thus making each possible link between arbitrary agents i and j more likely to exist.
25 In between these two values the first moment of the degree distribution is finite, but the second and higher moments diverge as the network size becomes infinite. The boundaries are justified by the fact that most empirically observed social networks exhibit a slope between these two values, which implies a ultra small-world network (Cohen and Havlin 2003) . Notice that increasing the parameter γ implies lowering the probabilities to observe highly-connected individuals, thus leading to sparser networks, and to smaller hubs.
